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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
to   perceptions and thus shape the correct predictions. The exact 
anatomic implementation of not reward-related prediction error 
signals, that code for unexpected perceptions has yet to be revealed 
(Zacks et al., 2007). The proposed involvement of dopamine (Zacks 
et al., 2007) and the striatum’s extensive connectivity (Alexander 
et al., 1986; Saint-Cyr, 2003) render it a likely candidate as a site of 
not only reward-related prediction errors but also more general 
not reward-related prediction errors.
In  fact,  there  is  some  evidence  that  striatal  firing-patterns 
indeed convey prediction errors that are not related to reward. 
The respective authors likewise used the term prediction error to 
describe this dorso-striatal activity (Horvitz, 2000; Schultz and 
Dickinson, 2000; Graybiel, 2005). For the sake of distinction, we 
will refer to activation that has an amplitude that varies with the 
amount of (expected) reward as “reward prediction errors.” The 
prediction errors investigated in the current study, that have a 
positive amplitude to all violated predictions, will be called “breach 
of expectation” signals. This breach signal is related to a violated 
prediction in the simplest sense, i.e., a prediction of any given 
content is not fulfilled. Accordingly, increased activity toward 
every unexpected stimulus signifies the breach of expectation sig-
nal in dorsal striatum. Indeed, recent imaging studies in humans 
report caudate nucleus activity for unexpected changes in context, 
rules, and contingencies (Bunge et al., 2003; Delgado et al., 2005; 
O’Doherty et al., 2006; Badgaiyan et al., 2007; Koch et al., 2008; 
den Ouden et al., 2009, 2010). These activations can be broadly 
IntroductIon
The striatum was once considered a site of solely motor func-
tion, but research over the last three decades has put its cognitive 
functions more and more into focus (e.g., Alexander et al., 1986; 
Saint-Cyr, 2003; Grahn et al., 2008). One prominent function of 
the striatum is the coding of a reward prediction error in learning. 
These prediction errors are triggered by reinforcement or reward in 
conditioning paradigms (Schultz et al., 1997, 1998; Schultz, 2000). 
Reward prediction errors are signified by increases in striatal firing 
in the presence of unexpected reward or the presence of a reward-
predicting cue, or by a decrease of firing when predicted reward 
is omitted. The underlying notion to a reward prediction error is 
that the brain is capable of associating the current circumstances 
with a specific future state (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; Friston, 
2010). If the future becomes present and the state is different from 
what was predicted, this violation of predictions causes a prediction 
error, which in turn incites learning.
That the brain is a “predictive machine” is a feature of many 
models concerned with learning, action, and perception (Rescorla 
and Wagner, 1972; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000 Kiebel et al., 2008; 
Bubic et al., 2009; Friston, 2010). In an extension of the theory 
of motor control (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001), the brain’s abil-
ity to constantly predict ongoing movement, be it in the motor 
domain or in perception, has been emphasized (Schutz-Bosbach 
and Prinz, 2007). Presence of prediction implies the possibility of 
computing prediction errors, to adjust internal models according 
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stimuli. The study of Davidson et al. (2004), for example, revealed 
a negative response of the caudate to unexpected target omission, 
which could be reframed as occurrence of a unpredicted target-
free stimulus.
Taken collectively, the data suggest that caudate prediction error 
signals are not restricted to conditioning protocols and that they do 
not revolve solely around the availability of reward. The empirical 
evidence implies the presence of breach of expectation signals in 
caudate nucleus when an event deviates from predictions, but there 
is a need to probe the assumption directly.
The lack of studies that target breach of expectation signals is 
surprising given not only the role they play in current computer 
models on the matter (Kilner et al., 2007; Kiebel et al., 2008; Friston, 
2010) but the enormous relevance of correcting false assumptions 
to prevent possibly fatal future mistakes. The educative effect of 
breaches of expectation is so strong that it operates even when 
observing other peoples behavior. Consider the example of seeing 
someone being bitten by a bulldog after having tread on its paw. 
If you used to regard bulldogs as aggressive animals, this would 
not breach your expectations and not incite changes in your views 
on bulldogs and your behavior toward them. In other words, you 
wouldn’t have learned anything. Now consider watching someone 
being bitten by a poodle after stepping on its paw. This may be a 
severe breach of your expectations and teach you to regard poodles 
more suspiciously in future and adapt your behavior toward them 
accordingly. This is an example of observational learning, which 
does not imply direct reinforcement – it also embellishes two things. 
The first is the importance of the severity of a breach of expectation 
to learning. The second is the bonus derived from valid forward 
models in guiding behavior.
The current study investigates whether caudate nucleus signals 
for breaches of expectation in a movement observation paradigm. 
We hypothesized that watching a dancer make a mistake in a set-
ting of clear-cut cue-movement schedule would yield a caudate 
response. To keep track of the dancer’s performance, participants 
had to register auditory cues that determined what movement the 
dancer was to perform next, and watch the ensuing movements. To 
ensure that all participants were capable of the required prediction, 
we subdued them to motor training, where they had to accord to 
the cue-movement schedule themselves.
Breaches of expectation carry two secondary attributes that 
could each potentially cause striatal activations. Specifically, these 
events are of an increased saliency and often prompt to modify 
ongoing behavior. Saliency can be conceived of as a function of 
stimulus frequency (Zink et al., 2003) and is an attribute carried of 
not-habituated stimuli (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). As violated 
predictions were rarely encountered in the present paradigm, i.e., 
infrequent, they might hence elicit striatal activation due to their 
saliency (Horvitz, 2000; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). Movement 
switches as opposed to executing one movement repeatedly have 
also been associated with striatal activity (Roy et al., 1993; Graybiel, 
2005). Encountering violated predictions in the paradigms is related 
to having to switch to a new internal movement simulation to 
keep track of the task. Moreover, as the paradigm included exten-
sive training, there may have been an association of movement 
errors with initiation of a new movement. Hence, saliency and 
  movement switches had to be investigated separately, to ensure 
that these attributes of violated predictions could not account for 
potentially recorded striatal activity.
We  employed  an  experimental  design  that  allowed  to  test 
whether caudate activity actually reflects breaches of expectation 
(violation hypothesis – i), or is rather dependent on effects of sali-
ency (saliency hypothesis – ii) or switching to a different behavior 
(change hypothesis – iii). Breaches of expectation were modeled 
by contrasting predicted with prediction-violating movements. In 
accordance with the frequency or habituation approach in the lit-
erature, we modeled saliency as a function of stimulus frequency 
in the immediate trial history. Initiation of a new movement was 
implemented in the movement observation paradigm by contrast-
ing the cues that indicated a new upcoming movement against cues 
that indicated a movement repetition.
Although the present study focused on striatal responses, it was 
to be expected that they come along with cortical activations, as 
a prominent characteristic of the neostriatum is its pronounced 
connectivity with a large number of cortical regions and thalamic 
nuclei (Alexander et al., 1986; Saint-Cyr, 2003). More specifically, 
activation could be expected in regions related to the processing 
of biological motion (due to the mismatch between perceived and 
expected stimulus; Keysers and Perrett, 2004) and those related to 
attentional modulation more generally (due to the explicit instruc-




Fourteen right-handed, healthy participants (eight women, age 
22–29, mean age 24.8) took part in the study. Each participant’s 
laterality quotient, as assessed with the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was higher than 60. All participants were 
health screened by a physician and gave informed written consent.
task-systeMatIc
The movement repertoire consisted of five whole-body movements. 
Each movement consisted of three sub-movements which engaged 
a characteristic combination of extremities (Figure 1). Each of these 
movements was assigned an arbitrary name, comprising three 
syllables, each associated with one corresponding sub-movement 
(Ko-re-pa; Fe-so-da; Gu-la-mi; Ba-ki-te; Wa-ne-ro). None of these 
names is meaningful in German; neither were the combinations 
of the two first or last syllables of each. Importantly, in the course 
of the experiment, each movement (e.g., Ko-re-pa) could only be 
followed by one specific other (e.g., Fe-so-da) or by a repetition 
of itself (e.g., Ko-re-pa). Two piano chords, easily discernible even 
in absence of former musical training, were used to cue the transi-
tion between two movements. Each cue coincided with the onset 
of one movement and delivered an instruction on which move-
ment was to follow the respective movement that had began when 
the cue sounded. The low chord meant that the transition follow-
ing the current movement had to be a repetition (i.e., the same 
movement again; if the movement that started when the cue was 
presented was for example Ko-re-pa, the low chord meant it had 
to be followed by another Ko-re-pa). The high chord signaled that 
the transition following the current movement had to be a switch 
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wise gray computer screen, using the Software Presentation 12.0 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA, USA). Visual input 
did not extend further than 5° of visual angle. The movies were 
stopped in irregular intervals and participants had to indicate by 
button press, whether the dancer had performed correctly imme-
diately before video offset. That is, participants had to indicate 
whether the very last movement had been correct, irrespective 
of possible earlier errors. Questions were indicated by a question 
mark (“?”) displayed in font size 24 for 1500 ms or until the first 
response. Participants had to press the arrow-to-the-left key (index 
finger) if they judged the last movement to have been according 
to cue or press the arrow-to-the-right key (middle finger) if they 
thought the movement had not been according to cue. Responses 
had to be given within a timeframe of 1500 ms and were followed 
by a valid feedback for 400 ms indicating correct, incorrect or 
delayed responses (“+”/“−”/“0”; Figure 2).
In both the behavioral and the fMRI session, the task encom-
passed 400 single movements. Thirty-two movements were not 
according to cue, i.e., the dancer switched to the next movement 
when a repetition had been cued (16), or a repetition was performed 
after a switch had been announced (16). Forty breaks disrupted the 
movie, which was thus divided into 41 videos of varying duration 
(3–17 movements each). In the behavioral experiment, all 40 breaks 
were question trials, 20 of them requesting an affirmative answer.
(i.e., the corresponding next movement; if the concurring move-
ment was Ko-re-pa, the high chord meant it had to be followed by 
Fe-so-da). Switches were always switches to the next movement in 
a circular order (Figure 1), no movement was ever skipped. Thus, 
the upcoming movement was fully predictable, even if it differed 
from the current movement.
schedule
The  overall  experimental  schedule  compromised  three  stages. 
Participants first had to pass a computer based behavioral experi-
ment (stage 1) to be admitted to training (stage 2). If they com-
pleted training successfully, they were allowed to participate in the 
fMRI experiment (stage 3), which was virtually identical to the 
initial behavioral probe. The two test sessions and the movement 
training incorporated the same system of dynamically evolving 
movement sequences.
stage 1: BehavIoral ProBe sessIon
In the computer task, participants watched a dancer perform-
ing according to cue, but occasionally making mistakes. Previous 
to playing the task, the participants were instructed on the cue- 
movement associations that rule the task (low chord: repetition; 
high chord: switch). They received a short training where they 
could choose either four or eight example movies that contained 
up  to  19  cued  movements,  before  they  started  the  task.  The 
FIguRe 1 | Movement sequence with depiction of respective sub-
movements; the cue presented at each movement onset, determines the 
transition after completion of respective movement; low tune (red note): 
repetition of the movement (follows red line); high tune (green note): 
switch to the next movement (follow the green line). Example: (i) a high 
chord sounds before ko-re-pa (2), indicating that the next movement must be 
fe-so-da (3 – a switch must take place); before fe-so-da starts, a low chord 
sounds (4) indicating that fe-so-da (5) must be followed by fe-so-da (6 repetition).
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only have been allowed to start the movement upon presentation 
of a third cue. Once every participant mastered this first step, the 
number of successive movements (cues) was constantly increased. 
If one or more participants made a mistake, the sequence had to 
be started from the beginning. This procedure was implemented in 
every training session forthwith, at the end of which participants 
mastered up to 18 cues in a row. Importantly, during training, more 
than four identical transitions in a row were possible. At the same 
time, participants had to keep moving at a high level of accuracy and 
trainers would correct them verbally, and, if necessary, by showing 
the model-video, over the entire course of training. At the end of 
the last training session, participants were filmed while performing 
three 15-cue sequences without further assistance (motor probe). 
During recording, they wore uniform clothing to allow for unbiased 
assessment of their performance in a later video evaluation.
stage 3: fMrI sessIon
In the fMRI session that was scheduled for the day after each par-
ticipant’s respective last training session, they encountered the 
same task as in the behavioral probe. Participants lay supine on 
the scanner. Their head and arms were stabilized using form-fitting 
cushioning and their hands rested on a rubber foam tablet. On the 
right hand side, a response panel was mounted and fixed on the 
tablet. With their right hand index and middle finger resting on two 
response buttons, participants were able to judge on the correctness 
of the dancers movements within the same response contingencies 
as in the behavioral test. They wore earplugs to attenuate scanner 
noise and received auditory input via headphones. Participants 
received visual input on a mirror that was built into the head-
coil and adjusted individually to allow for a comfortable view of 
the entire screen. All parameters were identical to the behavioral 
experiment (stage 1) with the exception that 24 breaks were used 
for question trials and 16 for null events (empty trials).
Up to four cues of the same kind, i.e., repetition or switch cues, 
could appear in a row. At the latest after the fourth identical transi-
tion cue (fourth switch or fourth repetition), a dissimilar transition 
was cued. Across the experiment, four, three, two, and one identical 
transitions after another appeared equally often. Thus, each cue that 
was dissimilar from the preceding cues could be differentiated from 
other first dissimilar cues by the number of preceding transitions 
that had been identical to each other. For example, a repetition cue 
could be the first repetition after two switches, or the first repeti-
tion after four switches. This randomization was employed to test 
for the assumptions of the saliency hypothesis (ii). The number of 
preceding different cues was a measurement of cue saliency against 
the backdrop of recent cue history.
stage 2: MoveMent traInIng
The participants that passed the 85% criterion of the behavioral 
experiment subsequently received six 1-h movement-training ses-
sions within 10 days in order to establish a routine-like training stage 
for the cued performance of movement sequences. Training sessions 
were conducted in a small dance hall, one side walled with a mirror. 
During the first session, participants were taught the strict order 
of the five encompassed movements and learnt accurate perform-
ance of the single movements and the associated movement names. 
To that end, they were allowed to watch a model performing the 
respective movement on a laptop screen as often as they liked. Once 
the trainers were satisfied with accuracy of movement perform-
ance, participants were verbally instructed to conduct movement 
sequences, starting each movement when it was called out to them. 
In their second training session, participants learnt to move accord-
ing to the cues. They started with a two-cue sequence. For exam-
ple: Participants were told to start with the movement Ko-re-pa, 
as soon as the first cue sounded. If the cuing chord was low, they 
performed Ko-re-pa twice. Importantly they had to start the second 
Ko-re-pa after the second cue had rung. They had to withhold the 
FIguRe 2 | example for two alternative task-developments: each 
picture is one movement within a movie, the notes signify high or low 
chords. The actress could either perform the last movement before offset 
correctly (1), meaning the participants would have to judge the performance 
as correct by index finger button press (“y”). Or the last movement was not 
according to cue, a breach of expectation (2); the participants would then 
have to answer by middle-finger button press (“n”) to judge the dancer’s 
behavior as incorrect. Errors’ during the movie where not to be judged 
upon. Movie offset and thus relevance of the error to the task was not 
predictable.
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  repetition cues (see below). The model encompassed null events 
as an additional vector. The violation hypothesis (i) contrasted 
invalidly cued switches and invalidly cued repetitions vs. validly 
cued switches and validly cued repetitions. The saliency hypoth-
esis (ii) parametrically modeled the first dissimilar transition cue 
after 4, 3, 2, or 1 identical transition cue(s), ascribing the highest 
activation level (vector amplitude) to the dissimilar successor of 
four cues identical to each other. (The switch cue in Table 2, for 
example would have been assigned a vector amplitude of three; the 
immediately following repetition cue would have been assigned a 
vector amplitude of one). In addition, to discern whether potential 
effects would rely more on a first switch after a number of repeti-
tions or first repetition after a number of switches, we modeled 
these contrasts in the same fashion of increasing vector values sepa-
rately, too. That is, in one parametric contrast we ascribed a vector 
amplitude to each first switch according to the number of previous 
repetitions (saliency of switches contrast); in the other parametric 
contrast, the vector amplitude of each first repetition accorded to 
previous switches (saliency of repetitions contrast). The change 
hypothesis (iii) was modeled by comparing switch cues to repeti-
tion cues. Contrast images, i.e., differences of beta-value estimates 
for the specified conditions, were generated for each participant. 
All contrast images were fed into a second-level random effects 
analysis. The group analysis consisted of one-sample t-tests across 
all contrast images to analyze whether the observed differences 
between conditions were significantly deviant from 0. Acquired 
t-values were transformed to z-scores. To correct for false-positive 
results, an initial z-threshold was set to 2.56 (p < 0.05, one-tailed, 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons). In a second step, the results 
were corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level, using 
cluster size and cluster value thresholds that were obtained by 
Monte-Carlo simulations. The employed significance level was 
p = 0.05. Hence, the reported activations are significantly activated 
at p ≤ 0.05, corrected for comparison at cluster level.
trIPle-glM aPProach
In the triple-GLM approach the contrasts (i–iii) were calculated 
from the same events as described above. However, we employed a 
different GLM for each contrast that encompassed only the events 
necessary for the contrast and null-events. The GLM for the viola-
tion contrast (i) encompassed validly cued switches, validly cues 
repetition, invalidly cued switches and invalidly cues repetitions, 
and null-events. The GLM for the saliency contrast (i) encom-
passed all first dissimilar cues with a vector amplitude reflecting 
the number of previous identical repetitions and null-events. The 
GLM for the change hypothesis encompassed all repetition cues 
and all switch cues. Group analysis and corrections were identical 
to the single-GLM analysis described above.
results
BehavIoral
Fifteen of 19 volunteers passed the initial behavioral probe at the 
85% criterion. All participants completed training and responded 
correctly to cue – sequences of up to 18 cues. In the fMRI session, 
14 out of 15 participants performed to criterion, with a mean rate 
of 91.1% correct responses, standard deviation (SD) at 5.4%. Mean 
data acquIsItIon
A  3T  Siemens  Magnetom  Trio  scanner  (Siemens,  Erlangen, 
Germany) was used in the functional imaging session. In a sepa-
rate session, prior to the functional MRT, high-resolution 3D T1 
weighted whole-brain MDEFT sequences were recorded for every 
participant (128 slices, field of view 256 mm, 256 × 256 pixel matrix, 
thickness 1 mm, spacing 0.25 mm). The functional session engaged 
a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence sensitive 
to blood oxygen level dependent contrast (28 slices, parallel to the 
bicommisural plane, echo time 30 ms, flip angle 90°; repetition time 
2000 ms; interleaved recording). Following the functional session 
immediately, a set of T1 weighted 2D-FLASH images was acquired 
for each participant (28 slices, field of view 200 mm, 128 × 128 
pixel matrix, thickness 4 mm, spacing 0.6 mm, in-plane resolu-
tion 3 × 3 mm).
fMrI data analysIs
Functional data were offline motion-corrected using the Siemens 
motion protocol PACE (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Further 
processing was conducted with the LIPSIA (Lohmann et al., 2001) 
software package. Cubic-spline interpolation was used to correct 
for the temporal offset between the slices acquired in one scan. To 
remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline drifts, a 1/80 Hz 
filter was applied. The matching parameters (6 degrees of freedom, 
3 rotational, 3 translational) of the T1 weighted 2-D FLASH data 
onto the individual 3-D MDEFT reference set were used to calculate 
the transformation matrice for linear registration. These Matrices 
were subsequently normalized to a standardized Talairach brain size 
(x = 135, y = 175, z = 120 mm; Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) by 
linear scaling. The normalized transformation matrices were then 
applied to the functional slices, to transform them using trilinear 
interpolation and align them with the 3-D reference set in the stere-
otactic coordinate system. The generated output had thus a spatial 
resolution of 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm (27 mm3).
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-square estimation 
using the general linear model (GLM) for serially auto-correlated 
observations. Temporal Gaussian smoothing (4 s FWHM) was 
applied to deal with temporal autocorrelation and determine the 
degrees of freedom (Worsley and Friston, 1995). All design matrices 
were generated by hemodynamic modeling using a γ-function. We 
conducted the analysis once using only one GLM and once more 
using three GLMs (triple-GLM hereafter), one for each competing 
contrast. In the single-GLM approach, the three contrasts were set 
to compete for variance in one GLM to achieve a thorough model 
comparison. In the triple-GLM approach, the same whole-brain 
analyses was conducted with three separate GLMs, in order to not 
underestimate the effects of the competing alternative hypotheses 
and give them a more liberal chance to yield potential caudate activ-
ity. The onset vectors were modeled in a time-locked event-related 
fashion, i.e., the duration set to one second. The first derivative 
was taken into the model to improve model fit for latency effects.
sIngle-glM aPProach
The events to account for the violation hypothesis (i) were the 
dancer’s incorrect movements, for the other hypotheses (ii and iii) 
the modeled events were specific cues. Hence, the model encom-
passed the following event types: correct movements, incorrect 
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only the contrast accounting for activity increase with the number 
of prior repetitions of identical movements revealed significant 
activation (saliency of switches contrast). This activity was in sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) and postcentral gyrus. There were 
no significant correlations with the number of preceding switches. 
Similarly, there was no significant activation for the general saliency 
effect, that is number of identical transitions preceding a dissimilar 
transition, pooled over switches and repetitions. Contrasting switch 
cues with repetition cues to account for the change hypothesis (iii) 
yielded the right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and bilaterally 
(anterior) IPS. Notably, there was no significant striatal activation, 
neither in the parametric contrasts relating to the saliency hypothesis 
(ii), nor in the contrast relating to change hypothesis (iii; Table 2).
trIPle-glM aPProach
The triple-GLM analysis was employed to calculate the same con-
trasts as the single-GLM analysis but from three GLMs, optimized 
for differential effects. This approach yielded caudate activity also 
only in the violation contrast (i; Table 3; Figure 5). There was no 
striatal activity either in the saliency (ii) or change contrast (iii). 
Likewise, cortical activations identified by the violation (i; Table 3, 
Figures 5 and 6) contrast did not differ largely between the analo-
gous contrasts from the single GLM vs. triple-GLM analyses. The 
triple-GLM analysis also revealed no significant activity for the 
saliency (ii) contrast. The parallel change (iii) contrasts from the 
two analysis approaches revealed quite similar patterns (Tables 2 
and 4 for comparison).
dIscussIon
The present study set out to investigate the role of the caudate 
nucleus in events that violate predictions (i). In contrast to previous 
studies, these events were not feedback in an operant conditioning 
task and involved neither reinforcement nor punishment. Hence, 
we termed these prediction-violating events “breaches of expec-
tation” to distinguish them from prediction errors conceived as 
activity dependent on (future) reception of reward. Moreover, we 
extended the study-design to exclude the possibility that the striatal 
activity could be a consequence of potential secondary character-
istics of violated predictions, that is responses to salient events (ii) 
and events that provoke a change in behavior (iii).
The contrast accounting for the violation hypothesis (i) yielded 
activation in the basomedial caudate nucleus. On the contrary, 
striatal activation was absent in the contrasts that accounted for 
rate of correct rejections was 91.7% (SD = 7.3%) and that of hits 
equaled 90.5% (SD = 7.2%). A two-tailed t-test revealed no signifi-
cant difference between the averages of hits and correct rejections. 
One participant had to be excluded from further analyses due to 
insufficient performance (below 2 SDs from mean).
fMrI
sIngle-glM aPProach
The contrast between movements that deviated from cue and move-
ments that accorded to the previous cue (violation hypothesis, i) 
yielded significant bilateral activations in the basomedial caudate 
nucleus (Figure 3) and right medial pallidum, in the habenula, the 
anterior dorsal insula, mesial frontomedian cortex (Brodmann’s 
area [BA] 8 and 9), lateral BA 10, and intraparietal sulcus (IPS). 
Significant lateralized activations were found in left angular gyrus 
(AG), right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and right 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Figure 4; Table 1).
FIguRe 4 | Single-gLM, violation hypothesis (i) contrast: main effect of movements deviating from cue vs. movements according to cue; group averaged 
activations are shown (at z > 3.09) on sagittal slices (x = −52; 0; 52) of an individual brain, normalized and aligned to the Talairach stereotactic space. Refer 
to Table 1 for activation coordinates.
FIguRe 3 | Single-gLM, violation hypothesis (i) contrast: main effect of 
movements deviating from cue vs. movements according to cue; group 
averaged activations are shown (at z > 3.09) on an axial slice (z = 10) of an 
individual brain, normalized and aligned to the Talairach stereotactic 
space. Refer to Table 1 for activation coordinates.
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fulfilled, the deterministics of the task are apparently understood. 
Accordingly, the diminution of caudate activity over the course of 
learning is rooted in the fact that only as long as the rules of the task 
are unknown (at the beginning of learning), predictions are con-
stantly violated, driving caudate activity. Once the rules have been 
established, breaches of expectation wane and so does caudate activ-
ity. The notion that a breach of expectation signal is generated in 
caudate nucleus could also account for impairments of Parkinson’s 
disease patients in trial and error learning (Shohamy et al., 2008). 
Their compromised breach of expectation signal, due to neostri-
atal dysfunction, hinders updating wrong beliefs and accordingly 
adapting behavior. More evidence for a caudate signal for breaches 
of expectation comes from studies showing that caudate activity 
ceases the earlier, the easier it is to learn the association between 
cues and correct actions, i.e., the easier it is to build up operative 
predictions (Delgado et al., 2005; Koch et al., 2008). The same 
the saliency (ii) or change (iii) hypotheses, even when we calculated 
these contrasts from separate optimized GLMs in the triple-GLM 
approach. This pattern of results suggests the dorsal striatum to 
be tuned to violations of current predictions rather than to these 
events’ saliency or implied incite to switch behavior. Moreover, the 
results show that dorso-striatal responses to violated predictions are 
not restricted to reinforcement or punishment protocols.
caudate nucleus sIgnals for Breaches of exPectatIon
The results of the current study suggest that activity in the head 
of caudate nucleus signals breaches of expectation, i.e., violated 
predictions, more generally than previously assumed. This finding 
may explain why this area is often found in trial and error learning, 
where its activity diminishes once learning has occurred (Jueptner 
and Weiller, 1998; Delgado et al., 2005; Shohamy et al., 2008; Ruge 
and Wolfensteller, 2009). Trial and error learning means building 
up predictions what cues demand which action to gain reward. If 
Table 1 | Single-gLM, violation hypothesis (i) contrast: Anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x,y,z) and maximal z-scores of significantly 
activated voxels for prediction-violating in contrast to prediction-conform movements.
Localization  Talairach coordinates  z-values,
    local maxima
  x  y  z 
Superior frontal gyrus (SFG)/pre-SMA (BA 8/6)  −2  21  45  5.8
  4   36  27  5.6
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG; BA 8/9)  −41  15  39  5.1
  37  9  30  4.9
  34  33  30  5.3
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), BA 10  31  54  18  4.7
  −26  48  6  4.9
Dorsal anterior insula  −32  21  0  5.9
  28  18  0  6.2
Angular gyrus (AG)   −56  −45  36  4.9
Inferior parietal lobule (LPI)  34  −51  45  5.3
  −53  −51  39  4.8
Intraparietal sulcus (IPS)  −41  −36  39  5.6
  52  −45  33  5.1
Posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23)  −5  −21  30  3.5
  7  −33  30  3.9
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)   49  −36  0  4.5
Temporal-parietal junction (TPJ)  −50  −48  12  3.9
Precuneus  −8  −66  45  5.1
Basomedial head of caudate nucleus (CAU)  −11  6  6  5.6
  10  9  9  5.4
Medial globus pallidus (GPi)  13  0  3  5.7
Habenula  1  −27  3  5.7
Thalamus, ventrolateral nucleus (VL)  −14  −15  3  5.4
  −14  −12  12  4.7
Nucleus ruber  −8  −27  −6  4.9
  4  −27  −6  5.1
Cerebellum  16  −48  −15  4.1
  −17  −84  −21  4.9
  28  −54  −24  4.6
  −32  −60  −24  5.0
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striatum, a fast transmission of perceived deviations to neostriatum 
is accounted for. Moreover, projections from the AG to caudate 
nucleus have recently been confirmed by diffusion-tensor imaging 
in humans (Uddin et al., 2010).
With regard to this connectivity and these regions’ functions 
as described in the literature, the concurrent activation for the 
violation contrast is quite plausible. The pSTS is activated when 
perceiving biological motion and shows enhanced activation for 
movements that deviate from expectations (Keysers and Perrett, 
2004). Adjacent TPJ is involved in predicting the end-state of move-
ments (Arzy et al., 2006) and also in reorienting in space (Blanke 
et al., 2004; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Accordingly, pSTS 
enhancement may indicate the dissimilarity between a covert motor 
plan in our highly trained subjects and the actually perceived (false) 
movement. TPJ activation, moreover, may result from perceiving 
limb trajectories toward end-states that differed from the expected 
(or even covertly prepared) ones. The spreading of activation into 
AG fosters the idea put forward by other authors that TPJ, extend-
ing into AG, actually responds to breaches of expectation (Vossel 
et al., 2006; Shulman et al., 2009). These authors employed par-
adigms where a number of cues signaled where a target would 
appear with different probabilities. Interestingly, when a cue that 
indicated a high probability of a certain target position was vio-
lated, the resulting activation was higher than for the violation of 
less predictive cues. It therefore seems as if the more surprising an 
outcome is, that is, the more it violates a current prediction, the 
higher is the resultant AG activation (Vossel et al., 2006; Shulman 
et al., 2009). Besides, the aforementioned studies used abstract 
stimuli, but employed paradigms demanding reorienting in space 
(Blanke et al., 2004; Vossel et al., 2006; Shulman et al., 2009; Van 
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The current study employed solely 
stimuli that represented human motion, but results agree with the 
literature that the function of reorienting of attention is related to 
activity in the temporo-parietal junction and posterior parietal 
cortex (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Within this framework, TPJ 
would be reframed as “circuit breaker,” which still implies the same 
function of detecting a salient stimulus that deviates from expecta-
tions (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
It can be suggested that after transmission of the perceived 
violation of prediction from the temporo-parietal network to the 
dorsal striatum, a breach of expectation signal is provided by the 
dorsal striatum that incites the mediation of frontal responses 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). The consequential frontal network com-
prised the mesial frontal cortex bilaterally, specifically Brodmann 
area 8 (BA), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the presup-
plementary  motor  area  (pre-SMA),  anterior  dorsal  insula  and 
middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Of those, the anterior dorsal insula, 
ACC and mesial BA 8 have been implicated in situations character-
ized by uncertainty (Volz et al., 2003; Wager and Feldman, 2004; 
Volz, 2005), signifying the likelihood of errors and a need to adapt 
one’s expectations. In the present study, participants expected to 
  encounter events that would deviate from current predictions, but 
they lacked information regarding the time-point and frequency of 
such deviating events. Consequently, there was uncertainty toward 
the ruling probabilistic of the task.
  activity is persistent for cues that are non-informative, and this is 
for the same reasons, i.e., that they predict that either of two actions 
could be correct with the same probability. These cues make it 
impossible to establish reliable predictions (Delgado et al., 2005).
The present findings add to these results in an important fashion, 
showing caudate nucleus involvement for general breaches of expec-
tation, independent of ensuing feedback, in a movement observation 
paradigm. Breaches of expectation yielded caudate activity, even 
if the violated prediction was not a prediction on the availability 
of reinforcement, but only on the next movement that was to be 
observed. This finding of a “perceptual prediction error” (Zacks 
et al., 2007) stands in stark contrast to the aforementioned studies 
that investigated the caudate prediction error signal in relation to 
feedback on whether the participants had gained or lost money by 
their last action (Delgado et al., 2005; Koch et al., 2008; Tricomi and 
Fiez, 2008) Moreover, as the breaches of expectation in this study 
reflect perceptual prediction error, it establishes that this perceptual 
prediction error has a neural correlate in caudate nucleus.
cortIcal areas co-actIve wIth caudate nucleus
We found a number of cortical areas co-activated for the violation 
contrast, including the right posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS) and the adjacent tempo-parietal junction (TPJ) extending 
into AG. All three cortical regions are connected to the neostriatum 
by the fronto-occipital fasciculus as well as by the joint fasciculus 
subcallosal of Muratoff (Schmahmann and Pandya, 2006). This 
white-matter connectivity points to functionally closely interre-
Table 2 | Single-gLM, change hypothesis (iii) contrast: Anatomical 
specification, Talairach coordinates (x,y,z) and maximal z-scores of 
significantly activated voxels for prediction-violating in contrast to 
prediction-conform movements.
Localization  Talairach  z-values, 
  coordinates  local 
    maxima
  x  y  z 
Dorsal premotor cortex (PMd)  28  0  54  3.6
  −26  6  60  5.4
Middle frontal gyrus  31  42  24  4.1
Presupplementary motor  −5  9  48  3.6
area (pre-SMA)
Inferior frontal junction (IFJ)  −35  6  30  4.1
Superior parietal lobule (SPL)  19  −54  60  5.0
  −14  −69  48  5.0
Intraparietal sulcus (IPS)  −38  −42  51  4.2
  −29  −75  30  4.1
Posterior middle temporal  43  −69  3  4.0
gyrus (pMTG)
  −53  −66  6  4.2
  −47  −51  −9  5.4
Cuneus  −20  −96  3  4.0
Thalamus  −14  −15  12  4.6
Cerebellum  10  −51  −36  4.2
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prediction error (Hikosaka et al., 2008). Unexpected positive rein-
forcement causes a decrease in habenula activity. Meanwhile, during 
punishment or reward omission the habenula shows an activity 
increase (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). In contrast, caudate 
activity has been suggested to be different from both opponents 
in that it is increased in activity for every breach of expectation, 
regardless its valence (Horvitz, 2000). In the present study, the viola-
tions of current predictions did not entail negative consequences. 
However, making a mistake during behavioral training could well 
have been ascribed a negative valence. We suggest that as the par-
ticipants probably engaged in motor imagery to solve the task, 
exploiting their own memorized experiences during training, see-
ing the dancer deviating from the protocol was regarded an error 
with all negative implications (Preston and de Waal, 2001; Decety 
and Jackson, 2004; Singer et al., 2004). However, the fact that in 
The involvement of MFG signifies the high impact the task had 
on working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Braver et al., 1997). 
The participants had to judge a movement according to an auditory 
cue that had preceded the currently presented cue. At the same time 
they had to register the current cue to predict the next movement. 
This protocol amounts to a one-back-task. Thus, MFG may reflect 
active retrieval of the last cue in order to judge whether the cau-
date-conveyed deviation signal was meaningful or not. Engaging 
working memory in response to a signaled deviation accords to the 
assumption that in uncertain situations, PFC explores alternatively 
operating models (Daw et al., 2005).
suBcortIcal Breach of exPectatIon codIng
Apart from caudate nucleus, an important subcortical compo-
nent of the activity in the violation contrast was the habenula. 
The habenula codes exclusively for negative prediction errors, and 
Table 3 | Triple-gLM, violation hypothesis (i) contrast: Anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x,y,z) and maximal z-scores of significantly 
activated voxels for prediction-violating in contrast to prediction-conform movements.
Localization  Talairach coordinates  z-values, local maxima
  x  y  z 
Superior frontal gyrus (SFG)/pre-SMA (BA 8/6)  −2  21  48  5.8
  4   36  27  5.6
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG; BA 8/9)  −41  15  39  5.1
  37  15  36  4.8
  37  33  27  5.0
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), BA 10  31  54  18  4.8
  −26  48  6  4.9
Dorsal anterior insula  −32  21  3  5.8
  28  18  −3  6.0
Angular Gyrus (AG)   −56  −45  36  4.9
Inferior parietal lobule (LPI)  34   −51  45  5.3
  −53  −51  39  4.8
Intraparietal sulcus (IPS)  −41  −36  39  5.6
  52   −45  33  5.1
Posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23)  −2  −21  33  3.6
  7   −33  30  3.7
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)  49  −36  0  4.6
Temporal-parietal junction (TPJ)  −50   −48  12  3.6
       
Precuneus  −5  −66  42  4.7
Basomedial head of caudate nucleus (CAU)  −11  6  6  5.7
  10  9  9  5.4
Medial globus pallidus (GPi)  13  0  3  5.8
Habenula  1  −27  3   5.4
Thalamus, ventrolateral nucleus (VL)  −14  −15  3  5.0
  −14  −12  12  4.7
Nucleus ruber  −8  −27  −6  4.8
  4  −27  −6  5.0
Cerebellum  16  −48  −15  4.0
  −17  −81  −21  4.9
  28  −54  −24  4.4
  −32  −60  −24  5.0
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movements deviating from cue vs. movements according to cue; group 
averaged activations are shown (at z > 3.09) on an axial slice (z = 10) of an 
individual brain, normalized and aligned to the Talairach stereotactic 
space. Refer to Table 3 for activation coordinates.
FIguRe 6 | Triple-gLM, violation hypothesis (i) contrast: main effect of movements deviating from cue vs. movements according to cue; group averaged 
activations are shown (at z > 3.09) on sagittal slices (z = −52; 0; 52) of an individual brain, normalized and aligned to the Talairach stereotactic space. Refer 
to Table 3 for activation coordinates.
this study the signal to violated predictions in caudate nucleus is 
enhanced at the same time that the habenula codes for a negative 
prediction error, underpins the breach of expectation nature of 
caudate activity. We find an activity increase for events that are 
not predicted in the current forward model, not a typical negative 
prediction error, as the corresponding habenula activity may sug-
gest (Jocham and Ullsperger, 2009).
PredIctIons, devIatIons, and learnIng
In the animal literature, prediction errors are mostly described 
as resultant from the occurrence or omission of reward (Schultz 
et al., 1997), thereby related to satisfying or averse (external) stim-
uli. Prediction errors are defined as decreased activity in the face 
of omitted reward or punishment. However, the current study 
revealed evidence for heightened caudate activity toward violated 
predictions in insufficient or failing forward models, and hence 
breaches of expectation. Establishing predictions and especially 
signaling for a breach of expectation may be as important as cod-
ing how much reward (e.g., food or money) is available, or how 
unpredicted primary reward was (Spicer et al., 2007). The limita-
tions of fMRI in proving neurotransmitter involvement do not 
allow drawing the inference that this caudate activity was based 
in a dopaminergic response (Düzel et al., 2009). The dopaminer-
gic innervation of the dorsal striatum (see Joel and Weiner, 2000 
#197 for a review) and the response of the habenula (Jocham and 
Ullsperger, 2009) implicate the dopaminergic system, but further 
studies are needed to decide whether dopamine is involved in not 
reward related breaches of expectation. New approaches, espe-
cially the free-energy principle (Friston, 2010) stress the value of 
predictive capability per se, i.e., the ability to detect breaches of 
expectation (Kiebel et al., 2008; Suddendorf et al., 2009; Friston, 
2010). This model regards correct predictions as prerequisite for 
Table 4 | Triple-gLM, change hypothesis (iii) contrast: Anatomical 
specification, Talairach coordinates (x,y,z) and maximal z-scores of 
significantly activated voxels for prediction-violating in contrast to 
prediction-conform movements.
Localization  Talairach  z-values, 
  coordinates  local maxima
  x  y  z 
Dorsal premotor cortex (PMd)  −20  −6  51  4.4
Ventral premotor cortex (PMv)  −53  6  33  4.1
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG)  43  24  39  3.9
Superior frontal gyrus (SFG), BA 8  −8  27  36  3.7
Presupplementary motor  −5  9  48  4.8
area (pre-SMA)
Superior parietal lobule (SPL)  22  −57  63  4.0
  −26  −51  57  3.9
Intraparietal sulcus (IPS)  −50  −27  33  4.4
  34  −30  42  4.0
  25  −63  42  3.9
Posterior middle temporal  40  −57  6  4.8
gyrus (pMTG)
  −53  −69  3  5.1
  −44  −51  −9  3.7
Precuneus  7  −51  57  3.9
Lingual gyrus  13  −96  −12  3.6
Schiffer and Schubotz  Caudate in breaches of expectation
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 38  |  10Graybiel, A. M. (2005). The basal ganglia: 
learning new tricks and loving it. Curr. 
Opin. Neurobiol. 15, 638–644.
Hikosaka, O., Sesack, S. R., Lecourtier, L., 
and Shepard, P. D. (2008). Habenula: 
crossroad between the basal ganglia 
and the limbic system. J. Neurosci. 28, 
11825–11829.
Horvitz, J. C. (2000). Mesolimbocortical 
and nigrostriatal dopamine responses 
to  salient  non-reward  events. 
Neuroscience 96, 651–656.
Jocham, G., and Ullsperger, M. (2009). 
Neuropharmacology of performance 
monitoring. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 
33, 48–60.
Joel, D., and Weiner, I. (2000). The con-
nections of the dopaminergic system 
with the striatum in rats and primates: 
an analysis with respect to the func-
tional and compartmental organiza-
tion of the striatum. Neuroscience, 96, 
451–474.
Jueptner, M., and Weiller, C. (1998). A 
review of differences between basal 
ganglia and cerebellar control of 
movements  as  revealed  by  func-
tional imaging studies. Brain 121, 
1437–1449.
Keysers, C., and Perrett, D. I. (2004). 
Demystifying  social  cognition:  a 
Hebbian perspective. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. 8, 501–507.
Kiebel, S. J., Daunizeau, J., and Friston, K. 
J. (2008). A hierarchy of time-scales 
and the brain. PLoS Comput. Biol. 
4:e1000209. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pcbi.1000209
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., and Frith, C. D. 
(2007). Predictive coding: an account 
of the mirror neuron system. Cogn. 
Process 8, 159–166.
Koch,  K.,  Claudia,  S.,  Gerd,  W., 
Reichenbach, J. R., Sauer, H., and 
  following unexpected nonrewarding 
stimuli. Neuroimage 23, 1039–1045.
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). 
Uncertainty-based  competition 
between prefrontal and dorsolateral 
striatal systems for behavioral control. 
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711.
Decety, J., and Jackson, P. L. (2004). The 
functional architecture of human 
empathy. Behav. Cogn. Neurosci. Rev. 
3, 71–100.
Delgado, M. R., Miller, M. M., Inati, S., and 
Phelps, E. A. (2005). An fMRI study 
of reward-related probability learning. 
Neuroimage 24, 862–873.
den Ouden, H. E., Danizeau, J., Roiser, 
J., Friston, K. J., and Stephan, K. E. 
(2010). Striatal prediction error mod-
ulates cortical coupling. J. Neurosci. 30, 
3210–3219.
den Ouden, H. E., Friston, K. J., Daw, N. 
D., McIntosh, A. R., and Stephan, K. 
E. (2009). A dual role for prediction 
error in associative learning. Cerebr. 
Cortex 19, 1175.
Düzel, E., Bunzeck, N., Guitart-Masip, 
M., Wittmann, B., Schott, B. H., and 
Tobler, P. N. (2009). Functional imag-
ing of the human dopaminergic mid-
brain. Trends Neurosci. 32, 321–328.
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy prin-
ciple: a unified brain theory? Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 11, 127–138.
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). “Circuitry of 
primate prefrontal cortex and regula-
tion of behavior by representational 
memory,” in Handbook of Physiology 
– The Nervous System, Vol. 5. eds F. 
Plum and V. Mountcastle (Bethesda), 
373–417.
Grahn, J. A., Parkinson, J. A., and Owen, A. 
M. (2008). The cognitive functions of 
the caudate nucleus. Prog. Neurobiol. 
86, 141–155.
Schlösser, R. (2008). The neural cor-
relates of reward-related trial-and-
error learning: an fMRI study with 
a probabilistic learning task. Learn. 
Mem. 15, 728–732.
Lohmann, G., Karsten, M., Volker, B., 
Heiko, M., Sven, H., Lin, C., Zysset, S., 
and Yves von Cramon, D. (2001). Lipsia 
– a new software system for the evalua-
tion of functional magnetic resonance 
images of the human brain. Comput. 
Med. Imaging Graph 25, 449–457.
Matsumoto, M., and Hikosaka, O. (2009). 
Representation of negative motiva-
tional value in the primate lateral 
habenula. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 77–84.
O’Doherty, J. P., Buchanan, T. W., Seymour, 
B., and Dolan, R. J. (2006). Predictive 
neural coding of reward preference 
involves dissociable responses in 
human ventral midbrain and ventral 
striatum. Neuron 49, 157–166.
Oldfield, R.C. (1971). The assessment and 
analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh 
inventory.  Neuropsychologia,  9, 
97–113.
Preston, S. D., and de Waal, F. B. (2001). 
Empathy: its ultimate and proximate 
bases. Behav. Brain Sci. 25, 1–71.
Redgrave, P., and Gurney, K. (2006). The 
short-latency dopamine signal: a role 
in discovering novel actions? Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 7, 967–975.
Rescorla, R. A., and Wagner, A. W. 
(1972). “A  theory  of  Pavlovian 
conditioning:  variations  in  the 
effectiveness of reinforcement and 
nonreinforcement,”  in  Classical 
Conditioning II: Current Research 
and Theory, eds A. H. Black and W. 
F. Prokasy (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts), 64–99.
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., 
Crone, E. A., and Nieuwenhuis, S. 
references
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., and 
Strick. P. L. (1986). Parallel organiza-
tion of functionally segregated circuits 
linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annu. 
Rev. Neurosci. 9, 357–381.
Arzy, S., Thut, G., Mohr, C., Michel, C. 
M., and Blanke, O. (2006). Neural 
basis of embodiment: distinct contri-
butions of temporoparietal junction 
and extrastriate body area. J. Neurosci. 
26, 8074–8081.
Badgaiyan,  R.  D.,  Fischman,  A.  J., 
and Alpert, N. M. (2007). Striatal 
dopamine release in sequential learn-
ing. Neuroimage 38, 549–556.
Blanke, O., Theodor, L., Laurent, S., and 
Margitta, S. (2004). Out-of-body expe-
rience and autoscopy of neurological 
origin. Brain 127, 243–258.
Braver, T. S., Cohen, J. D. Nystrom, L. E. 
Jonides, J. Smith, E. E., and Noll. D. 
C. (1997). A parametric study of pre-
frontal cortex involvement in human 
working  memory.  Neuroimage  5, 
49–62.
Bubic, A., Yves Von Cramon, D., and 
Schubotz, R. I. (2009). Prediction, 
cognition  and  the  brain.  Front. 
Hum. Neurosci. 5:12. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2010.00025
Bunge, S. A., Kahn, I., Wallis, J. D., Miller, 
E. K., and Wagner, A. D. (2003). Neural 
circuits subserving the retrieval and 
maintenance of abstract rules.  J. 
Neurophysiol. 90, 3419–3428.
Corbetta, M., and Shulman, G. L. (2002). 
Control of goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention in the brain. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 3, 201–215.
Davidson, M. C., Horvitz, J. C., Tottenham, 
N., Fossella, J. A., Watts, R., Ulug, A. 
M., and Casey, B. J. (2004). Differential 
cingulate  and  caudate  activation 
breaches of expectation that allow for the generation and improve-
ment of an internal model are of utmost importance to survival, 
but also psychological wellbeing.
conclusIon
The results of the current study foster the idea that the caudate 
nucleus signals for occurrence of events that violate the predic-
tions of the operative forward model. This signal is not due to the 
perception of salient events or the need to change one’s behavior, 
and it is not based on direct reinforcement or punishment. Frontal 
activation that we observed may be triggered by this signal from the 
caudate nucleus and operate to deal with present altered environ-
mental demands; either via update of the current forward model 
or via assessment of the probability of certain event alternatives.
suPPleMentary MaterIal
The Movies S1 and S2 for this article can be found online at 
http://www.frontiersin.org/human_neuroscience/10.3389/
fnhum.2011.00038/abstract/
successful interaction with the environment, because recognizing a 
situation and acting accordingly is a capability owed to the disposal 
of valid forward models (Kiebel et al., 2008). The according actions 
may be to the end of satisfying primary needs or an evolved want. 
A typical aim in a social interaction would be, e.g., to adhere to 
the arrangement and to the task instruction in an fMRI study that 
were formerly mutually agreed upon. Operative forward models 
themselves can be valuable enough to be perceived as rewarding, 
even though they do not yield primary reward or reinforcement. 
Consider, for example, the psychological importance of a sense 
of control. In learned-helplessness paradigms, where animals are 
not able to predict and avoid punishment, pseudo-depression is 
a consequence (Seligman and Maier, 1967). Unpredictability is 
just another facet of non-operative forward-models. To establish 
operative forward models, breaches of expectation must be reg-
istered. If they cease to occur, this can be regarded as evidence 
that learning, i.e., model adaptation, was sufficient. The sense of 
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